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Available online 12 January 2016Over the past few decades obesity has become one of the largest public policy concerns among the adult popu-
lation in the developedworld. Obesity and overweight are hypothesized to affect individuals' sociability through
a number of channels, including discrimination and low self-esteem. However, whether these effects translate
into differential behavioural patterns in social interactions remains unknown. In two large-scale economic exper-
iments, we explore the relationship between Body Mass Index (BMI) and social behaviour, using three paradig-
matic economic games: the dictator, ultimatum, and trust games. Our ﬁrst experiment employs a representative
sample of a Spanish city's population (N=753), while the second employs a sample of university students from
the same city (N= 618). Measures of altruism, fairness/equality, trust and reciprocity are obtained from partic-
ipants' experimental decisions. Using a variety of regression speciﬁcations and control variables, our results sug-
gest that BMI does not exert an effect on any of these social preferences. Some implications of these ﬁndings are
discussed.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Keywords:
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Obesity is increasingly becoming one of the greatest public health
challenges in the 21st century. Moreover, nowadays the relevance of
obesity goes far beyond the boundaries of the medical world and oc-
cupies a central place in the everyday life of developed societies. A
clear picture of this evolution is provided in Fig. 1, which illustrates
how the term ‘obesity’ has rapidly migrated into our daily speech,
displacing other key health-related terms such as ‘heart attack’. This
comparison is particularly interesting because ‘heart attack’ showed
similar dynamics long time ago (in particular, in the 1920's and early
30's, in detriment of ‘pneumonia’ or ‘tuberculosis’). In the ﬁgure we
plot data from Chronicle (http://chronicle.nytlabs.com), a tool foriddlesex University Business
n, UK.
. Brañas-Garza).
. This is an open access article undergraphing the historical usage of words and phrases in New York Times
reporting. It can be seen that the number of NYT articles in which ‘obe-
sity’ features has dramatically increased from one or two dozen per year
in the 1960's to more than 500 in the early 2010's (representing about
0.02% and 0.40% of all NYT articles, respectively), with the biggest
boom taking place over the last decade. According to thismeasure, ‘obe-
sity’ has now reached a similar popularity to ‘heart attack’ among the
general public.
Based on the latest World Health Organisation estimates [82] the
number of obese people in the world has almost doubled since 1980s.
It is reported that, world-wide, at least 2.8 million people die each
year as a consequence of being overweight or obese, and an estimated
35.8 million (2.3%) global illnesses are caused by obesity or being over-
weight [81]. Obesity and overweight lead to adverse effects on blood
pressure, cholesterol, triglycerides and insulin resistance. Risks of type
2 diabetes, coronary heart disease and stroke increase steadily with in-
creasing BMI (body mass index), which is a measure of weight relativethe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Fig. 1.NYT usage of ‘obesity’ and ‘heart attack’ between 1960 and 2012. The ﬁgure reports absolute usage. According to Chronicle, in relative terms, ‘heart attack’ featured in about 0.80% of
all articles published in NYT in the 60's and 0.40% in the early 2010's; for ‘obesity’ these values range from b0.03% in the 60's to 0.40% in the early 2010's.
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health risk and it places a huge ﬁnancial burden on the governments
and healthcare systems across the globe.
Apart from these direct effects, BMI has been associated with a large
number of indirect inﬂuences on people's lives. Many of them have to
do with social ties in the sense that obesity and overweight affect not
only the individual but also the relationship with others. Correlates of
excess weight include low self-esteem [35,40] and self-control [19,57],
victimization and bulling among youth [42,64] and in the employment
arena [9,31,56,69], social stigma [63], shame [45,72], poor academic
performance [12,78], low income and socio-economic status [13,32,36,
71,74,83], disadvantageous marriage market outcomes [11,59], low
physical attractiveness ratings [60], aggressive behaviour and suicide in-
tentions [17,38], and problematic adolescence behaviour [54,79]. In
consequence, obesity and overweight do not only affect health condi-
tions but also impact individuals' sociability.
However, we do not know whether there are more fundamental ef-
fects of BMI on social behaviour in general. While some results might in-
tuitively suggest less “social” behaviour (e.g. aggression, victimization,
isolation, discrimination and self-discrimination1) or at least lower ability
to socialise, it is an open questionwhether these effects translate into less
pro-social patterns among high BMI individuals. Our paper ﬁlls this gap.
An interesting approach to this issue has been accomplished within
the literature on personality traits. Indeed, although some ﬁndings have
been inconsistent across studies, recent assessments suggest that excess
weight (and/or increases in BMI) may be negatively associated with
consciousness and agreeableness and positively with neuroticism, ex-
traversion and other impulsivity-related traits (e.g. [44,76,80]). This in-
dicates that obese individuals may be characterised by poor quality of
social relationships. However, these results are based on survey self-
reports thus lacking a direct measurement of individuals' actual behav-
ioural patterns.
Over the last 30 years there has been a boom in systematic studies of
social behaviour in controlled lab environments using economic incen-
tives. Behavioural and experimental economists have developed several
economic games to measure individual behaviour in a number of areas,
such as cooperation, trust, and networks. These games have been exten-
sively used in theory development and empirical inference, not only
within economics and the social sciences (e.g. [5,6,25–27,39,49]), but
also among the natural sciences (e.g. [14,22,58,62,66]).
While previous experimental economics researchhas studied the re-
lationship of BMI to risk [3,30] and time preferences [10,20,73], there is1 For instance, Proestakis andBranas-Garza [65] show that subjectswho consider them-
selves overweight demand less money as a compensation to ﬁll a questionnaire.as yet little evidence of a link between BMI and social (other-regarding)
preferences. Exploring the relationship between people's BMI and their
behaviour in controlled social environments is crucial to understanding
whether the inﬂuence of obesity and overweight on sociability-related
factors translates into different levels of concern among individuals for
others' welfare. In fact several experimental studies have shown that so-
cial preferences are related to social integration (centrality) in networks
[5,46,51].
A number of possible social motives have been discussed in the
literature (see [28] for a review), herewewill focus on individuals' pref-
erences for altruism, fairness/equality, trust and reciprocity. Based on
data from two large-scale economic experiments, this paper tests the
hypothesis that these social preferences are related to body weight
while controlling for potential confounding factors (such as socio-
demographics, cognitive skills, risk and time preferences). Given the
prevalence of obesity and overweight in developed societies, the results
might be informative for understanding behaviour in the workplace,
personal relationships and social interactions in general. Moreover,
from a dynamic perspective, a statistically signiﬁcant relationship
might suggest that as the population is becoming more obese, simulta-
neously our societies are becoming more or less ‘other-regarding’.
We analyse two complementary datasets from social preference ex-
periments involving realmonetary stakes. The ﬁrst dataset (the ‘city’ ex-
periment) is a representative sample of the adult population of a Spanish
citywhile the secondone (the ‘lab’ experiment) is a lab sample of univer-
sity students from the same city. The use of these two datasets
strengthens the validity of our results. Furthermore, the procedures
used in both experiments (see Methods) minimise potential self-
selection problems [24] and experimenter demand effects [84], which
may be particularly important in studying the connection between
BMI and social behaviour.
2. Methods
The city experiment took place between November and December
2010 in the city of Granada, Spain, with a representative sample of
835 citizens between 16 and 89 years old (as shown in Section S7 of
the Supplementary materials of [24], the sample was representative of
the city in terms of geographical situation of households and of age
and gender of participants). All subjects played the experimental
games in their own homes supervised by monitors (108 pairs of senior
university students acted as interviewers). The lab experimentwas con-
ducted in the Granada Lab of Experimental Economics (GLoBE-EGEO) at
the University of Granada during October 2011. Across 27 sessions of
20–30 subjects data were collected from a sample of 659 ﬁrst year
Fig. 2.Ultimatum (left) and trust (right) games in strategic form. The ﬁgure shows the payoffs (in €) associated to each of the possible outcomes of the games for ﬁrst and secondmovers,
respectively.
2 As one of the referees pointed out a critical issue is whether subjects in the ﬁeld under-
stood the experimental rules. Although the interviewers were instructed to ensure that par-
ticipants understood the instructions before making their decisions, this is still a valid
concern. To address this issuewe check the existence ofmultiple switching onUG responder
choice (i.e. accept an offer and reject a higher one), which is themost difﬁcult of the ﬁve de-
cisions. Multiple switching prevents obtaining a reliable MAO and indicates that the individ-
ual misunderstood the game instructions. Among thosewho completed thewhole survey in
the city sample (809), 778 were able to report a reliable MAO, representing 96% of cases. In
the lab sample, this percentage is 98%. We consider that this gives us a valuable indication
that most participants, more so those included in the analyses due to having reliable values,
understood correctly the instructions. In addition, note that in the main regressions we con-
trol for cognitive skills, which serves as a proxy for the participants' level of understanding.
Note that under the umbrella of “self-centred fairness” we include negative reciprocity and
the two forms of envy most commonly used to explain responder behaviour from an out-
come-based viewpoint, i.e. inequality-aversion and spite-based envy [7,28].
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for the city and lab experiments can be found in Exadaktylos et al. [24]
and Brañas-Garza et al. [7], respectively.
In both studies, subjects completed the exact same survey/experi-
ment. After an identical questionnaire, each participant made ﬁve ex-
perimental decisions with real monetary incentives. Our experimental
design consists of three canonical two-player games: Dictator Game
(DG), Ultimatum Game (UG) and Trust Game (TG). Decisions were
made in random order and all participants played both roles of each
game. For each decision, participants would bematchedwith a different
anonymous participant selected at random. One out of every ten partic-
ipants was randomly selected for real payment. In order to preserve in-
dependence between decisions, participants were instructed that they
would be paid for real according to only one randomly selected role.
In the DG [29], participants had to split an amount of €20 between
themselves and another anonymous participant. Subjects decided
which share of the €20 they wanted to transfer to the other participant
(in €2 increments).
Similarly, in theUG [34], the 1st player (the proposer) had to suggest
a way to split a €20 pie between him/herself and another anonymous
participant by making an offer to the 2nd player (the responder). How-
ever the implementation was upon acceptance of the offer by the ran-
domly matched responder. In case of rejection neither participant
earned anything. For the role of the responder in the UG we used the
strategy method in which subjects have to state in advance their will-
ingness to accept or reject each of the possible proposals [55]. The
responder'sMinimumAcceptable Offer (MAO) is theminimum amount
of money that the subject would accept (Fig. 2, left panel) and will be
our measure for responder behaviour.
In the TG (a strategy-method, binary version developed by [21]), the
trustor (1st player) had to decide whether to pass €10 or €0 to the
trustee (2nd player). In case of passing €0, the trustor earned €10 and
the trustee nothing. If she passed €10, the trustee would receive €40 in-
stead of €10 (moneywas being quadrupled). The trustee, conditional on
the trustor having passed the money had to decide whether to send
back €22 and keep €18 for him/herself or keep all €40 without sending
anything back, in which case the trustor did not earn anything (Fig. 2,
right panel).
Asmentioned earlier, each of these decisions is associatedwith a dif-
ferent social preference. While the DG measures altruism, the 1st
player's decision in the UGmeasures strategic altruism insofar as gener-
ous offers can stem from the fear of rejection. The 2nd UG player cap-
tures sense of self-centred fairness. In the TG, the 1st player's decisions
are driven by trust whereas the 2nd player's choices reﬂect positive
reciprocity.At the beginning of both experiments participants received some
general information about the nature of the experimental economic
games according to standard procedures. In particular, participants
were informed that:
• The ﬁve decisions involved real monetary payoffs coming from a na-
tional research project endowed with a speciﬁc budget for this pur-
pose.
• The monetary outcome would depend only on the participant's deci-
sion or on both his/her own and another randomly matched
participant's decision, whose identity would forever remain anony-
mous.
• One of every ten participants would be randomly selected to be paid,
and the exact payoff would be determined by a randomly selected
role.
Both experiments applied procedures that ensured absolute double-
blind anonymity. Thus, participants' decisions would remain forever
blind in the eyes of the interviewers, the researchers, and the randomly
matched participant. In the city experiment, once the general instruc-
tions had been given, the interviewer read the details for each experi-
mental decision separately. After every instruction set participants
were asked to write their decisions privately in a decision card and pro-
ceed to the next task. Once all theﬁve decisionsweremade, participants
introduced their decision card in an envelope and sealed it.2 However,
in the lab experiment these steps were taken on the computers as stu-
dents received their instructions on their screens. In both experiments,
to control for possible order effects on decisions, the sequence both be-
tween and within games was randomized across participants, resulting
in 24 different orders (always setting aside the two decisions of the
Fig. 3. Comparison of city and lab BMI. The blue line is representing the city sample (N=
753)while the brown line is referring to the lab sample (N=618). x̄c=24.23 (3.69) refers
to themean (SD) of the BMI distribution in the city sample, x̄l=21.83 (2.96) refers to the
mean (SD) of the BMI distribution in the lab sample.
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winning €0 (18.75% in the city and 11.43% in the lab), were €9.60 and
€10.43 for the city and lab experiments, respectively.
In the city experiment subjects did not knowabout the experimental
nature of the study before accepting to participate. It was only after
completing the ﬁrst seven survey blocks that they were informed of
the content of the experimental decisions. This procedure, added to
the fact that participants did not have to move to the lab, reduced the
scope for self-selection bias to inﬂuence the results (see [24]). In the
lab experiment students were invited to visit the lab by the Dean of
the School of Economics, so that they did not attend to earn money
but to see the lab, thus also reducing potential self-selection problems
– more than 70% of all registered students participated in this activity
– [1]. Once students were placed in their respective cubicles (which im-
peded visual contact between them) they were invited to complete the
survey and play the experimental games on the computers: no one
refused.
In the questionnaire, along with other extensive information on
socio-demographic, psychological and personality variables, partici-
pants were asked to self-report their weight and height. Participants'
BMI was calculated using the following standard formula: BMI =
Weight (kg) / Height (m)2. It must be noted that there is an obvious
issue concerning self-reported measures of weight and height: self-
reports may not provide the true picture of individuals' actual BMI ﬁg-
ures. Indeed, the clinical literature generally agrees that self-reported
data is inappropriate for precise measures of obesity prevalence [8,47,
53]. However, self-reported and measured BMI values are highly corre-
lated (r≈ 0.90; e.g. [75]) and self-reports are considered valid for iden-
tifying relationships, for instance, in epidemiological research [41,53,
77]. Importantly, the combination of experimental decisions and a
long multifaceted survey minimises potential demand effects [84] in
the sense that it is unlikely that participantsmake a conscious or uncon-
scious link between their answers to particular survey questions (in this
case, weight and height) and behaviour in the games.Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Variable City dataset Lab dataset p-Value
Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD
BMI 16.80 35.55 24.23 3.69 15.35 34.63 21.83 2.93 0.000⁎⁎⁎
Gender
(male)
0 1 0.46 0.50 0 1 0.42 0.49 0.230
Age 16 89 37.46 16.97 17 42 19.05 2.17 0.000⁎⁎⁎
DG offer 0 20 7.84 4.31 0 20 8.22 3.37 0.074⁎
UG offer 0 20 9.31 2.96 0 20 9.52 1.68 0.138
UG mao 0 10 7.02 3.55 0 10 6.02 3.08 0.000⁎⁎⁎
Trustor 0 1 0.70 0.45 0 1 0.70 0.46 0.766
Trustee 0 1 0.71 0.45 0 1 0.79 0.41 0.001⁎⁎⁎
Notes: p-Values in the last column correspond to the results of two-tailed tests comparing
both samples. T-tests were performed in all cases except for gender, trustor and trustee,
which were tested using Fisher's exact test.
⁎ p-Value b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p-Value b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p-Value b 0.01.3. Results
3.1. The data
The lab sample shows smaller mean and variance in the distribution
of BMI than the city sample. This means that, as expected, the lab data
does not describe accurately the real BMI distribution of the adult pop-
ulation. University students are on average younger and considered to
be more physically active than the representative population, thus
have lower average BMI levels. This results in the lab BMI distribution
being skewed to the left (Fig. 3). Two-tailed t-tests (assuming equal var-
iances and not) comparing themeans of the city (x̄c) and lab BMI distri-
butions (x ̄l) reject the null hypothesis of equal means (p b 0.001).
(Table A1 in Appendix shows that normality is rejected for both the
lab and the city samples.)
However, the advantage of the lab experiment is that it adds control.
Control is the main characteristic of lab experiments since in the ﬁeld it
is almost impossible to have the same level of supervision of procedures
and execution. Experiments run in the ﬁeld are typically richer in terms
of variability, representativeness, etc. but lack theprecision and credibil-
ity that the results obtained under lab conditions provide. Put differ-
ently, while the ﬁeld prioritises external over internal validity of
results, the opposite pattern holds for lab experiments (e.g. [37,52]).
Besides adding control, the lab dataset provides another important
advantage. In our lab sample the average age is 19.05, withmost obser-
vations being concentrated around that value (SD = 2.17). In contrast,
in the city sample the average age is 37.46 and there is high variation
(SD = 16.97). In sum, our two experiments complement each other.
The use of both samples will thus minimise internal and external valid-
ity concerns and add credibility to the ﬁndings.Now we turn to the descriptive statistics of our data. Note ﬁrst that
from the initial samples we excluded those observations with missing
values in any of the variables used for the statistical analyses (in total
77 in the city sample and 41 in the lab sample). According to spearman
correlations, in both samples older individuals and individuals with
lower cognitive skills are more likely to be excluded for this reason
(ps b 0.01 in the city and ps b 0.1 in the lab) as are married individuals
(p = 0.011) in the city and males (p = 0.055) in the lab; higher BMI
is marginally associated with the likelihood of being excluded in the
city sample (p = 0.070). In addition, the standard ‘mean ± 3 ∗ SD’
rule for detecting BMI outliers excluded 5 extra observations from the
city sample (no outliers were detected in the lab experiment). This pro-
cedure leads to ﬁnal sample sizes of 753 and 618 for the city and lab ex-
periments, respectively.
Table 1 presents theminimum,maximum,mean and standard devi-
ation of the BMI-related and game-behaviour variables, separately for
the city and lab samples. In the last column, we show the results of a se-
ries of statistical tests comparing both samples. As expected, the sam-
ples differed signiﬁcantly in terms of age and BMI, but not in gender
composition.
Regarding behaviour in the games, DG offer andUG offer refer to the
amount (between €0 and €20) transferred to the 2nd player in the
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imum acceptable offer stated by the participant when deciding as re-
sponder in the ultimatum game (between €0 and €10). On the other
hand, trustor is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the subject
passed themoney (€10) to the trustee in the trust game, and 0 if she/he
did not. Finally, trustee=1 if the subject reciprocated the trustor's trust
(€22, €18), and=0 otherwise (€0, €40). On average participants' offers
in the DG were marginally higher in the lab compared to the city sam-
ple, whereas the difference in UG offers did not reach statistical signiﬁ-
cance. Mean UG MAOs were however higher in the city sample, that is,
the sense of self-centred fairness appears to be stronger among ordinary
people. Lastly, while there were no differences in TG trustor decisions,
the lab participants were more likely to reciprocate as trustees than
the city participants (see Fig. A1 for the distribution of choices in the
games, separately for the city and lab experiments). Note that given
the recruitment method used, students in the lab were “pseudo-volun-
teers”, who have been previously found to be more pro-social than the
typical participants in economic experiments [18]. This might have
raised the average level of pro-social behaviour observed in our lab ex-
periment. Tables A2 and A3 report spearman correlations between the
ﬁve behavioural measures for the city and lab samples, respectively.
3.2. BMI and social preferences
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the results of a series of regressions esti-
mating game behaviour as a function of BMI and a set of control vari-
ables (socio-demographics, cognitive skills and economic preferences;
see the Appendix for a detailed description of the controls used). The
full regressions including estimates for all control variables are available
in Appendix Tables A4 and A5 (for the sake of completenesswe also dis-
play regressions without controls in Tables A6 and A7). Five models are
presented for each sample: DG and UG offers are the dependent vari-
ables in models (1) and (2), respectively, which are based in Tobit re-
gressions with left and right censoring. Model (3) estimates UG MAOs
using OLS. Finally, models (4) and (5) are Probit regressions estimating
behaviour as TG Trustor and Trustee, respectively. The same model
speciﬁcations are used in Exadaktylos et al. [24] and Brañas-Garza
et al. [6]. For each of these models we performed two regressions in
which we explore the linear relationship between BMI and behaviour
in that game (left column) as well as their quadratic relationship (by
adding BMI squared, BMIsq, as a regressor; right column).
Table 2 displays the regression results obtained from the city dataset.
It is noteworthy that only one signiﬁcant effect arises across all the ten
regressions. A non-linear, convex relationship is observed between
BMI and UG offers (i.e. strategic altruism), but the coefﬁcients are justTable 2
City sample.
DG offer UG offer U
(1) (2) (
BMI 0.013 −0.015 −0.007 −0.743⁎ −
(0.806) (0.978) (0.834) (0.056) (
BMIsq 0.001 0.014⁎
(0.959) (0.061)
Constant 6.955⁎⁎⁎ 7.304 10.782⁎⁎⁎ 19.662⁎⁎⁎ 3
(0.002) (0.306) (0.000) (0.000) (
Adj/pseudo R2 0
Log likelihood −2018.881 −2018.880 −1873.157 −1870.862
F/chi2 3.06⁎⁎⁎ 3.09⁎⁎⁎ 2.00⁎⁎⁎ 2.10⁎⁎⁎ 2
Controls Yes Yes Y
N 753 753 7
Notes: dependent variables are displayed on top of the columns. Tobit estimates for models (1
clustered on interviewers (108 groups). Controls include gender, age, age squared,marital statu
risk and time preferences. All regressions also control for order effects. p-Values in parenthese
⁎ p-Value b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p-Value b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p-Value b 0.01.marginally signiﬁcant and small in magnitude. When controls are ex-
cluded (Table A6), this relationship remains similar (note that, accord-
ing to the joint signiﬁcance Chi2 statistic, the model is no longer
signiﬁcant, so that we cannot reject that the coefﬁcients of BMI and
BMIsq are jointly equal to zero; indeed, the same hypothesis cannot
be rejected either in the model with controls of Table 2, p = 0.15).
Also, a marginally signiﬁcant, positive linear effect of BMI on DG offers
appears in themodel without controls (Table A6). Given that the coefﬁ-
cient of BMI is largely insigniﬁcant in themainmodel estimating DG of-
fers (p= 0.81, Table 2), we can infer that the relationship observed in
Table A6 is spurious and driven by other control variables with which
BMI is correlated. All the remaining estimates of either BMI or BMIsq
are far from signiﬁcant (ps N 0.4 in Table 2; ps N 0.3 in Table A6).
A graphical method based on locally weighted regressions (Lowess
smoothing) is used to identify possible higher-order polynomial rela-
tionships ormore complex patterns (without accounting for the control
variables though). Fig. 4 displays the results: no clear pattern is ob-
served beyond what we have already mentioned. One might wonder
whether the width of the age range analysed in the city sample (be-
tween 16 and 89 years old) could help to blur the effect of BMI on social
behaviour. To alleviate this concernwe performed the same regressions
restricting the sample to individuals between 20 and 50 years old (as
suggested by a reviewer, this would limit the possible role of height
growth before the 20's, and height shrinkage after the 50's). In these re-
gressions (n = 511), we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant result (even the
marginally signiﬁcant non-linear effect found for UG offers turns insig-
niﬁcant, all ps N 0.16; these analyses are available upon request from
the authors).
Table 3 presents the same regression models for the lab sample.
Here, none of the linear or non-linear effects of BMI are signiﬁcant
(modelswithout control variables do not report any signiﬁcant estimate
either; see Table A7). The only effect that is close to signiﬁcance is that
(linear) on TG trustee (p = 0.11 in Table 3; p = 0.17 in Table A7). All
the remaining coefﬁcients are largely insigniﬁcant again (ps N 0.3 in
Table 3; ps N 0.4 in Table A7). Lowess smoothing supports these null re-
sults;more complex patterns are neither observed (see Fig. 5). Also note
that the results are qualitatively similar if we exclude participants older
than 26 (8 observations, who are age outliers according to the ‘mean±
3 ∗ SD’ rule): the smaller p-value we obtain is 0.16 (available upon re-
quest from the authors).
It is also important to note that over half of the city and lab samples
chose to offer the equal split of 10 or more in the DG and UG. We con-
verted DG and UG offers into a binary variable (1 = 10 or more, and
0 = b10) and repeated the regressions (using probit models instead
of tobit) of Tables 2 and 3 for both DGandUGoffers. In these regressionsG mao Trustor Trustee
3) (4) (5)
0.005 0.362 −0.008 −0.068 −0.012 0.027
0.913) (0.424) (0.600) (0.650) (0.486) (0.866)
−0.007 0.001 −0.001
(0.421) (0.687) (0.803)
.379⁎⁎ −1.020 0.642 1.376 0.269 −0.213
0.035) (0.850) (0.265) (0.461) (0.669) (0.919)
.075 0.076 0.041 0.041 0.087 0.087
−435.996 −435.916 −410.844 −410.810
.18⁎⁎⁎ 2.11⁎⁎⁎ 62.98⁎⁎⁎ 70.60⁎⁎⁎ 96.99⁎⁎⁎ 97.44⁎⁎⁎
es Yes Yes
53 753 753
) and (2), OLS for model (3) and Probit for models (4) and (5). Robust standard errors are
s, unemployment, household income, household size, educational level, cognitive skills and
s.
Table 3
Lab sample.
DG offer UG offer UG mao Trustor Trustee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
BMI 0.005 −0.16 0.019 0.115 0.033 0.419 −0.012 −0.067 0.036 0.143
(0.927) (0.750) (0.345) (0.506) (0.452) (0.345) (0.529) (0.722) (0.114) (0.461)
BMIsq 0.004 −0.002 −0.008 0.001 −0.002
(0.740) (0.562) (0.384) (0.770) (0.574)
Constant 17.265⁎⁎ 19.115⁎ 9.348⁎⁎⁎ 8.283⁎⁎ 11.866⁎ 7.583 −1.574 −0.957 5.468 4.401
(0.027) (0.053) (0.001) (0.013) (0.076) (0.374) (0.563) (0.780) (0.310) (0.442)
Adj/pseudo R2 0.078 0.079 0.046 0.046 0.056 0.057
Log likelihood −1592.178 −1592.126 −1183.893 −1183.810 −359.605 −359.564 −298.628 −298.510
F/chi2 2.15⁎⁎⁎ 2.10⁎⁎⁎ 79.03⁎⁎⁎ 78.19⁎⁎⁎ 47.91⁎⁎⁎ 46.49⁎⁎⁎ 36.96⁎ 37.25 31.75 31.91
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 618 618 618 618 618
Notes: dependent variables are displayed on top of the columns. Tobit estimates for models (1) and (2), OLS for model (3) and Probit for models (4) and (5). Robust standard errors are
clustered at the individual level. Controls include gender, age, age squared, unemployment, household income, household size, cognitive skills and risk and time preferences. All regres-
sions also control for order effects. p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p-Value b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p-Value b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p-Value b 0.01.
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ps N 0.44) compared to the original regressions in Tables 2 and 3
(these analyses are also available upon request).
All in all, the most salient result from these two sets of regressions is
the lack of signiﬁcant results. Although one marginally signiﬁcant non-
linear effect of BMI on strategic altruism is observed in the city dataset, it
is economically small and not robust to different speciﬁcations. We also
analysed the interaction of BMI with the basic demographic controls in
order to test whether the (non) effects of BMI on game behaviour differ
across genders or age groups. None of the interactions yield signiﬁcant
estimates in either sample (ps N 0.25 in the city sample and ps N 0.19
in the lab sample; available upon request). We can therefore conclude
that, across the two samples under scrutiny, preferences for altruism,
fairness, trust or reciprocity are basically unrelated to BMI.Fig. 4. Lowess smoothing: game behaviour as a function of BMI (city sample).As robustness check, we conducted two extra exercises. First, in
Tables A8 and A9 we performed the same regressions but, instead of
using BMI as a continuous explanatory variable, we deﬁned dummy
variables for overweight (25 ≤ BMI b 30) and obesity (BMI ≥ 30). Second,
for themodels presented in Tables A10 and A11 we substituted BMI for
an index of body fat percentage, the CUN-BAE, recently developed by
Gómez-Ambrosi et al. [33]. The conclusions drawn from these regres-
sions are qualitatively the same: some marginally signiﬁcant effects
arise but none of them are robust. In particular, obese individuals
were less likely to reciprocate as TG trustees in the city but not in the
lab sample. Estimated body fat percentage (CUN-BAE) shows a non-
linear, convex relationship with UG MAOs in the city but not in the lab
sample, while a similar effect is observed on trustee choices in the labFig. 5. Lowess smoothing: game behaviour as a function of BMI (lab sample).
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dratic terms are not signiﬁcant). Yet, the p-values are all N0.09.
4. Discussion
Using data obtained from two large-scale experiments, we exam-
ined whether participants' BMI is associated with social behaviour in
economic games. Previous studies have established that obesity and
overweight status affect some aspects of sociality (e.g. [17,42,72]) and
covarywith several personality traitswhich are also known to inﬂuence
individuals' social relationships [44,76,80]. However, we do not ﬁnd
support for the hypothesis that these effects translate into differential
social preferences. To be more speciﬁc, we do not ﬁnd evidence that in
general altruism, fairness, trust, or reciprocity are associated with BMI
in either a representative or a student sample. Neither linear nor non-
linear systematic effects are observed.
It is therefore tempting to speculate that the massive variation in
BMI toward increasing obesity rates in the developed world is unlikely
to have a direct impact on the average levels of social preferences of
its citizens. Yet, this issue should studied by means of within-
individual analyses and is thus an interesting hypothesis to be tested
in future research using longitudinal data. Given that our results are
based on two Spanish samples and that this is, to the best of our knowl-
edge, the ﬁrst study looking at the relationship between BMI and social
preferences, further studies should also examinewhether theseﬁndings
can be extended to other countries/regions. Indeed, different cultures
have different attitudes toward obesity and body weight “ideals” [2,
61], and this might inﬂuence the relationship under study.An important issue here is that some of the variables associatedwith
the sociability of obese individuals, such as shame or stigmatisation [45,
63,65,72], have to do with the perception and/or behaviour of others.
Our experimental decisions were however made under conditions of
anonymity. According to the above, hence, it might be that high-BMI
people change their social behaviour in the presence of others, or of
cues of being watched (in the general population, these types of cues
have been found to inﬂuence, for instance, cooperation behaviour; see
[4]), or that other individuals display differential patterns when they
know that their partner is obese (e.g. [50]).
Another potential avenue for experimental research in this area
could involve subjects who self-select into the experiment. Along
these lines, it might interesting to explore whether subjects who report
their BMI during the recruitment process behave differently compared
to those who report their BMI during the experiment (so that body
weight concerns become salient). These are all promising directions
for future research.Acknowledgements
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A.1. Variables description
The deﬁnitions of control variables that are not self-explanatory are the following:
In the regressions using the city sample, marital status groups are compared against “single”, which is the omitted category (marital status controls
are not included in the regressions for the lab sample because virtually all subjects were single); household income refers to self-reported net house-
hold monthly income and consists of 10 categories corresponding to €0-€4500 (in €500 increments); education refers to the subject's educational
level and has 9 categories from “did not study at all” to “graduate university degree” (in the lab sample, the education variable is not included because
its value was the same for all subjects); nperhousehold measures the number of individuals living in the subject's household.
Risk 1, risk 2 and risk 3 refer to the subject's attitudes toward ﬁnancial risk and are dummy variables where 1 means that the subject chose the risky
option, and 0 that s/he chose the non-risky option. Risk attitudes are controlled for since payments were probabilistic and both the UG and the TG
involve some strategic risk. The risk questions are the following:
Risk 1: 1 if option b, 0 if option a in the question: “We ﬂip a coin. Choose one of the following options: a. Take 1.000 Euros no matter if it is heads or
tails; b. Take 2.000 Euros if it is heads and nothing if it is tails”.
Risk 2: 1 if option a, 0 if option b in the question: “Choose one of the following options: a. Take a lottery ticket with 80% chance of winning 45 Euros
and 20% chance of winning nothing; b. Take 30 Euros”.
Risk 3: 1 if ‘Yes’, 0 if ‘No′ in the question: “Would you accept the following deal? We ﬂip a coin. If it is heads you win 1,500 Euros and if it is tails you
lose 1,000 Euros”.
Note that risk 1 captures “risk-loving” in the domain of gains when both the risky and the non-risky option have the same expected value. Risk 2
captures risk-loving in the gains domain as well, but in a question where the risky option yields a higher expected value than the non-risky one. Fi-
nally, risk 3 captures risk loving when the risky option involves possible losses.
Impatience corresponds to the number of impatient choices the subject made in an inter-temporal choice task and captures preference for sooner-
smaller rewards over larger but more delayed rewards (see [23] for further details on this survey-based discounting task). For eliciting impatience,
hypothetical rewards were used due to logistical reasons and because previous evidence has shown that the use of real (vs. hypothetical) incentives
does not signiﬁcantly change the distribution of individual inter-temporal choices (see, e.g. [43,48]). Due to their large number, observations with
missing values on this variable (subjects whomade inconsistent choices in the task) are adjusted to the mean in order not to disproportionately re-
duce sample size. Themeasure of impatience is included as a control since thepayments of the experimentwere delayed, and because impatience has
been found to affect behaviour in strategic social interactions [15,22,23]. In addition, time and risk preferences are considered two key dimensions of
impulsivity [67], which is thought to be an important determinant of eating disorders and obesity (e.g. [20,57,68]).
Cogn skills correspond to the cognitive abilities of a subject measured by the number of correct answers to the following ﬁve questions:
1. If theprobability of being infected by an illness is 10%, howmany per-
sons of a group of 1000would be infected by that kind of illness? (N if
s/he cannot/do not want to answer).
2. If there are 5 persons that own the winning lottery ticket and the
prize to be shared is two million Euros, how much money would
each person receive?
3. Suppose that you have €100 in a savings account and the rate of in-
terest that you earn from the savings is 2% per year. If you keep themoney in the account for 5 years, how much money would you
have at the end of these 5 years?
a. More than €102
b. €102 exactly
c. Less than €102
d. S/he cannot/do not want to answer
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mulates a 10% rate of interest per year. Howmuchmoney would you
have in your account after two years?C
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n5. The total cost of a bat and a ball is 1.10 Euros. The bat costs 1 Euro
more than the ball. How many cents does the ball cost?Table A1. BMI skewness/kurtosis tests for normality.Sample N p (skewness) p (kurtosis) adj. chi2 p N chi2ity 753 0.000⁎⁎⁎ 0.680 34.45 0.000⁎⁎⁎b 618 0.000⁎⁎⁎ 0.000⁎⁎⁎ 73.47 0.000⁎⁎⁎LaNotes: skewness/kurtosis tests for normality [16] with correction for overall Chi2 and its signiﬁcance level [70].
⁎ p-Value b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p-Value b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p-Value b 0.01.Table A2. Spearman correlations between social preference measures (city sample; N=
753).DG offer UG offer UG mao TrustorG offer 0.409⁎⁎⁎(0.000)
G mao 0.053 0.080⁎⁎(0.145) (0.028)
rustor 0.136⁎⁎⁎ 0.123⁎⁎⁎ −0.001(0.000) (0.001) (0.970)
rustee 0.303⁎⁎⁎ 0.211⁎⁎⁎ −0.048 0.306⁎⁎⁎(0.000) (0.000) (0.187) (0.000)Notes: p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p-Value b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p-Value b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p-Value b 0.01.Table A3. Spearman correlations between social preference measures (lab sample; N =
618).DG offer UG offer UG mao TrustorG offer 0.335⁎⁎⁎(0.000)
G mao 0.034 0.114⁎⁎⁎(0.395) (0.005)
rustor 0.064 0.017 −0.077⁎(0.112) (0.669) (0.056)
rustee 0.229⁎⁎⁎ 0.121⁎⁎⁎ −0.018 0.160⁎⁎⁎(0.000) (0.003) (0.664) (0.000)Notes: p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p-Value b 0.1.⁎⁎ p-Value b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p-Value b 0.01.Table A4. City sample.DG offer UG offer UG mao Trustor Trustee(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)MI 0.013 −0.015 −0.007 −0.743⁎ −0.005 0.362 −0.008 −0.068 −0.012 0.027
(0.806) (0.978) (0.834) (0.056) (0.913) (0.424) (0.600) (0.650) (0.486) (0.866)MIsq 0.001 0.014⁎ −0.007 0.001 −0.001
(0.959) (0.061) (0.421) (0.687) (0.803)ender (male) −0.455 −0.450 0.038 0.157 −0.200 −0.260 −0.090 −0.080 0.077 0.070
(0.272) (0.271) (0.875) (0.518) (0.422) (0.340) (0.353) (0.425) (0.505) (0.547)ge 0.006 0.006 −0.026 −0.018 0.125⁎⁎⁎ 0.122⁎⁎⁎ 0.005 0.006 0.011 0.010
(0.944) (0.941) (0.625) (0.728) (0.003) (0.004) (0.788) (0.765) (0.605) (0.625)gesq 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.001⁎⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.995) (0.992) (0.660) (0.756) (0.010) (0.013) (0.758) (0.736) (0.865) (0.887)arried 1.067 1.067 0.292 0.313 −1.340⁎⁎⁎ −1.351⁎⁎⁎ 0.254 0.255 0.112 0.112
(0.119) (0.118) (0.464) (0.426) (0.006) (0.006) (0.124) (0.122) (0.554) (0.556)ivorced 2.105⁎⁎⁎ 2.104⁎⁎⁎ 0.237 0.230 −0.972 −0.969 −0.073 −0.075 0.245 0.246
(0.008) (0.008) (0.744) (0.749) (0.228) (0.231) (0.793) (0.787) (0.429) (0.428)idow −0.081 −0.077 0.215 0.329 0.448 0.390 0.209 0.218 0.425 0.418
(0.941) (0.943) (0.735) (0.599) (0.546) (0.605) (0.472) (0.452) (0.258) (0.272)ohabiting −0.130 −0.128 −0.847⁎ −0.801⁎ −0.530 −0.553 0.473⁎ 0.476⁎ −0.232 −0.235
(0.914) (0.916) (0.059) (0.076) (0.450) (0.431) (0.054) (0.051) (0.454) (0.450)nemployed −0.554 −0.555 −0.042 −0.041 0.284 0.285 0.163 0.162 −0.096 −0.095
(0.202) (0.203) (0.867) (0.869) (0.341) (0.341) (0.109) (0.111) (0.448) (0.451)ousehold income −0.135 −0.135 0.020 0.022 0.050 0.049 0.006 0.006 −0.021 −0.021
(0.238) (0.238) (0.737) (0.717) (0.444) (0.456) (0.799) (0.790) (0.440) (0.436)perhousehold 0.051 0.051 −0.055 −0.056 0.245⁎⁎ 0.245⁎⁎ −0.075⁎ −0.076⁎ −0.052 −0.052
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F/DG offer UG offer UG mao Trustor Trustee(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)(0.744) (0.744) (0.632) (0.625) (0.025) (0.024) (0.070) (0.070) (0.208) (0.207)
ducation 0.073 0.073 0.066 0.066 −0.099 −0.099 0.001 0.001 0.013 0.013(0.534) (0.534) (0.389) (0.392) (0.141) (0.143) (0.965) (0.967) (0.630) (0.631)
isk 1 −0.411 −0.412 −0.071 −0.084 1.109⁎⁎⁎ 1.116⁎⁎⁎ −0.068 −0.068 −0.381⁎⁎ −0.380⁎⁎(0.449) (0.448) (0.821) (0.788) (0.003) (0.003) (0.604) (0.600) (0.017) (0.017)
isk 2 0.787⁎ 0.788⁎ −0.070 −0.048 −0.067 −0.077 0.179⁎ 0.181⁎ −0.099 −0.100(0.059) (0.060) (0.797) (0.858) (0.834) (0.808) (0.095) (0.090) (0.358) (0.354)
isk 3 2.090⁎⁎⁎ 2.092⁎⁎⁎ 1.138⁎⁎⁎ 1.183⁎⁎⁎ −0.665 −0.687 0.781⁎⁎⁎ 0.786⁎⁎⁎ 0.530⁎⁎⁎ 0.528⁎⁎⁎(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.228) (0.216) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.006)
ogn skills −0.126 −0.126 −0.050 −0.042 0.227⁎⁎ 0.223⁎⁎ 0.019 0.020 0.107⁎⁎ 0.106⁎⁎(0.490) (0.491) (0.607) (0.667) (0.038) (0.044) (0.663) (0.647) (0.012) (0.012)
patience −0.093 −0.093 −0.063 −0.064 0.099⁎⁎ 0.100⁎⁎ −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001(0.259) (0.259) (0.108) (0.101) (0.032) (0.031) (0.955) (0.949) (0.972) (0.974)
onstant 6.955⁎⁎⁎ 7.304 10.782⁎⁎⁎ 19.662⁎⁎⁎ 3.379⁎⁎ −1.020 0.642 1.376 0.269 −0.213(0.002) (0.306) (0.000) (0.000) (0.035) (0.850) (0.265) (0.461) (0.669) (0.919)
dj/pseudo R2 0.034 0.034 0.041 0.041 0.087 0.087
g likelihood −2018.881 −2018.880 −1873.157 −1870.862 −435.996 −435.916 −410.844 −410.810
chi2 3.06⁎⁎⁎ 3.09⁎⁎⁎ 2.00⁎⁎⁎ 2.10⁎⁎⁎ 2.18⁎⁎⁎ 2.11⁎⁎⁎ 62.98⁎⁎⁎ 70.60⁎⁎⁎ 96.99⁎⁎⁎ 97.44⁎⁎⁎753 753 753 753 753NNotes: dependent variables are displayed on top of the columns. Tobit estimates for models (1) and (2), OLS for model (3) and Probit for models (4) and (5). Robust standard errors are
clustered on interviewers (108 groups). All regressions control for order effects. p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p-Value b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p-Value b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p-Value b 0.01.Table A5. Lab sample.DG offer UG offer UG mao Trustor Trustee(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)MI 0.005 −0.160 0.019 0.115 0.033 0.419 −0.012 −0.067 0.036 0.143
(0.927) (0.750) (0.345) (0.506) (0.452) (0.345) (0.529) (0.722) (0.114) (0.461)MIsq 0.004 −0.002 −0.008 0.001 −0.002
(0.740) (0.562) (0.384) (0.770) (0.574)ender (male) −0.216 −0.198 −0.097 −0.107 −0.062 −0.104 0.128 0.135 −0.043 −0.054
(0.525) (0.565) (0.489) (0.443) (0.820) (0.710) (0.289) (0.270) (0.737) (0.678)ge −0.950 −0.944 −0.008 −0.010 −0.730 −0.741 0.214 0.215 −0.556 −0.57
(0.175) (0.177) (0.973) (0.964) (0.214) (0.208) (0.375) (0.372) (0.272) (0.266)gesq 0.024 0.024 0.000 0.001 0.016 0.017 −0.004 −0.004 0.013 0.013
(0.127) (0.129) (0.924) (0.911) (0.206) (0.199) (0.448) (0.444) (0.277) (0.271)nemployed 0.721 0.722 −0.282 −0.281 0.443 0.445 −0.142 −0.142 0.053 0.052
(0.396) (0.395) (0.449) (0.450) (0.517) (0.515) (0.625) (0.624) (0.862) (0.863)ousehold income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.368) (0.383) (0.772) (0.755) (0.408) (0.377) (0.147) (0.141) (0.928) 0.957perhousehold −0.128 −0.127 −0.052 −0.052 0.225⁎ 0.223⁎ −0.020 −0.020 0.042 0.041
(0.459) (0.461) (0.441) (0.438) (0.083) (0.087) (0.721) (0.722) (0.488) (0.498)isk 1 0.812⁎ 0.808⁎ −0.088 −0.086 0.546 0.555 0.505⁎⁎⁎ 0.504⁎⁎⁎ 0.124 0.126
(0.079) (0.080) (0.696) (0.702) (0.165) (0.159) (0.009) (0.009) (0.527) (0.521)isk 2 −0.457 −0.453 −0.128 −0.130 −0.018 −0.023 0.034 0.034 −0.273⁎⁎ −0.276⁎⁎(0.160) (0.162) (0.379) (0.374) (0.948) (0.932) (0.779) (0.775) (0.033) (0.031)
isk 3 0.594 0.598 −0.274 −0.277 −0.210 −0.221 0.256 0.257 −0.136 −0.138(0.147) (0.144) (0.339) (0.334) (0.600) (0.582) (0.150) (0.148) (0.425) (0.421)
ogn skills 0.056 0.052 0.120 0.123 −0.187 −0.178 −0.039 −0.040 0.190⁎⁎ 0.193⁎⁎(0.790) (0.806) (0.113) (0.106) (0.259) (0.287) (0.594) (0.584) (0.013) (0.012)
patience 0.092 0.091 0.038 0.039 0.067 0.069 0.010 0.010 −0.022 −0.022(0.186) (0.188) (0.258) (0.251) (0.246) (0.232) (0.672) (0.673) (0.379) (0.385)
onstant 17.265⁎⁎ 19.115⁎ 9.348⁎⁎⁎ 8.283⁎⁎ 11.866⁎ 7.583 −1.574 −0.957 5.468 4.401(0.027) (0.053) (0.001) (0.013) (0.076) (0.374) (0.563) (0.780) (0.310) (0.442)
dj/pseudo R2 0.036 0.036 0.046 0.046 0.056 0.057
g likelihood −1592.178 −1592.126 −1183.893 −1183.810 −359.605 −359.564 −298.628 −298.510
chi2 2.15⁎⁎⁎ 2.10⁎⁎⁎ 79.03⁎⁎⁎ 78.19⁎⁎⁎ 47.91⁎⁎⁎ 46.49⁎⁎⁎ 36.96⁎ 37.25 31.75 31.91618 618 618 618 618NNotes: dependent variables are displayed on top of the columns. Tobit estimates for models (1) and (2), OLS for model (3) and Probit for models (4) and (5). Robust standard errors are
clustered at the individual level. All regressions control for order effects. p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p-Value b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p-Value b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p-Value b 0.01.
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RDG offer UG offer UG mao Trustor Trustee(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)MI 0.089⁎ 0.033 0.007 −0.654⁎ 0.008 0.325 −0.006 −0.021 0.012 0.132
(0.077) (0.955) (0.834) (0.089) (0.852) (0.415) (0.654) (0.882) (0.355) (0.325)MIsq 0.001 0.013⁎ −0.006 0.000 −0.002
(0.924) (0.087) (0.431) (0.914) (0.372)onstant 5.357⁎⁎⁎ 6.049 9.137⁎⁎⁎ 17.323⁎⁎⁎ 6.850⁎⁎⁎ 2.921 0.688⁎⁎ 0.877 0.273 −1.205
(0.000) (0.408) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.553) (0.031) (0.624) (0.389) (0.471)dj/pseudo R2 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
g likelihood −2054.998 −2054.993 −1892.689 −1890.707 −454.771 −454.765 −449.937 −449.571
chi2 3.14⁎ 1.58 0.04 1.47 0.03 0.36 0.20 0.21 0.85 1.78
ontrols NO NO NO NO NO753 753 753 753 753NNotes: dependent variables are displayed on top of the columns. Tobit estimates for models (1) and (2), OLS for model (3) and Probit for models (4) and (5). Robust standard errors are
clustered at the individual level. p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p-Value b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p-Value b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p-Value b 0.01.Table A7. Lab sample.DG offer UG offer UG mao Trustor Trustee(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)MI 0.023 −0.218 0.016 0.059 0.004 0.174 −0.005 0.066 0.027 0.047
(0.637) (0.658) (0.402) (0.767) (0.927) (0.654) (0.774) (0.710) (0.170) (0.806)MIsq 0.005 −0.001 −0.004 −0.002 0.000
(0.619) (0.823) (0.656) (0.687) (0.917)onstant 7.611⁎⁎⁎ 10.357⁎ 9.160⁎⁎⁎ 8.681⁎⁎⁎ 5.947⁎⁎⁎ 3.999⁎⁎ 0.640 −0.167 0.215 −0.006
(0.000) (0.072) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.377) (0.110) (0.935) (0.622) (0.998)dj/pseudo R2 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003
g likelihood −1611.732 −1611.622 −1202.659 −1202.643 −377.132 −377.056 −315.633 −315.629
chi2 0.22 0.27 0.70 0.37 0.01 0.10 0.08 0.25 1.89 1.91
ontrols NO NO NO NO NO618 618 618 618 618NNotes: dependent variables are displayed on top of the columns. Tobit estimates for models (1) and (2), OLS for model (3) and Probit for models (4) and (5). Robust standard errors are
clustered on interviewers (108 groups). p-Values in parentheses.
⁎ p-Value b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p-Value b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p-Value b 0.01.Table A8. City sample.DG offer UG offer UG mao Trustor Trustee(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)bese −0.050 0.142 0.236 −0.096 −0.343⁎(0.945) (0.746) (0.654) (0.615) (0.090)
verweight −0.721 −0.152 −0.188 −0.037 −0.093(0.110) (0.625) (0.567) (0.767) (0.504)
ender (male) −0.326 0.038 −0.194 −0.096 0.081(0.417) (0.871) (0.425) (0.314) (0.486)
ge 0.013 −0.025 0.127⁎⁎⁎ 0.005 0.009(0.875) (0.639) (0.003) (0.805) (0.667)
gesq 0.000 0.000 −0.001⁎⁎⁎ 0.000 0.000(0.962) (0.675) (0.010) (0.774) (0.952)
arried 1.168⁎ 0.285 −1.347⁎⁎⁎ 0.254 0.140(0.083) (0.475) (0.006) (0.133) (0.458)
ivorced 2.095⁎⁎⁎ 0.223 −0.990 −0.072 0.264(0.008) (0.757) (0.218) (0.797) (0.392)
idow 0.034 0.223 0.464 0.202 0.418(0.975) (0.724) (0.529) (0.493) (0.268)
ohabiting −0.112 −0.858⁎ −0.541 0.471⁎ −0.224(0.928) (0.058) (0.439) (0.055) (0.469)
nemployed −0.575 −0.050 0.275 0.162 −0.097(0.186) (0.840) (0.356) (0.114) (0.445)
ousehold income −0.137 0.021 0.051 0.006 −0.022(0.232) (0.728) (0.435) (0.792) (0.417)
perhousehold 0.052 −0.054 0.247⁎⁎ −0.076⁎ −0.055(0.740) (0.642) (0.025) (0.069) (0.185)
ducation 0.065 0.066 −0.099 0.001 0.012(0.581) (0.390) (0.137) (0.966) (0.670)
isk 1 −0.386 −0.084 1.093⁎⁎⁎ −0.069 −0.375⁎⁎(0.479) (0.788) (0.003) (0.598) (0.019)
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BDG offer UG offer UG mao Trustor Trustee(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)isk 2 0.771⁎ −0.062 −0.056 0.179⁎ −0.107
(0.066) (0.819) (0.859) (0.093) (0.327)isk 3 2.127⁎⁎⁎ 1.145⁎⁎⁎ −0.654 0.778⁎⁎⁎ 0.529⁎⁎⁎(0.001) (0.005) (0.231) (0.000) (0.005)
ogn skills −0.123 −0.049 0.229⁎⁎ 0.019 0.104⁎⁎(0.506) (0.620) (0.035) (0.671) (0.014)
patience −0.098 −0.064 0.098⁎⁎ −0.001 −0.001(0.235) (0.104) (0.035) (0.962) (0.966)
onstant 7.304⁎⁎⁎ 10.593⁎⁎⁎ 3.179⁎⁎⁎ 0.480 0.049(0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.335) (0.925)
dj/pseudo R2 0.034 0.041 0.090
g likelihood −2017.622 −1872.913 −435.989 −409.626
chi2 3.08⁎⁎⁎ 2.11⁎⁎⁎ 2.21⁎⁎⁎ 66.36⁎⁎⁎ 98.68⁎⁎⁎753 753 753 753 753NNotes: dependent variables are displayed on top of the columns. Tobit estimates for models (1) and (2), OLS for model (3) and Probit for models (4) and (5). Robust standard errors are
clustered on interviewers (108 groups). All regressions control for order effects. p-Values in parentheses. Descriptive statistics: a.) Obese: x̄: 0.087, SD: 0.282, Min: 0, Max: 1; b.) Over-
weight: x̄: 0.266, SD: 0.442, Min: 0, Max: 1.
⁎ p-Value b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p-Value b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p-Value b 0.01.Table A9. Lab sample.DG offer UG offer UG mao Trustor Trustee(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)bese 0.112 −0.019 −0.088 0.041 0.551
(0.917) (0.938) (0.917) (0.925) (0.254)verweight 0.304 0.126 0.549 −0.175 0.338
(0.495) (0.455) (0.113) (0.297) (0.105)ender (male) −0.226 −0.077 −0.046 0.121 −0.009
(0.497) (0.583) (0.862) (0.308) (0.942)ge −0.912 0.015 −0.643 0.185 −0.521
(0.194) (0.948) (0.278) (0.447) (0.299)gesq 0.023 0.000 0.014 −0.003 0.012
(0.144) (0.996) (0.272) (0.530) (0.304)nemployed 0.737 −0.282 0.460 −0.146 0.046
(0.385) (0.446) (0.504) (0.614) (0.880)ousehold income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.389) (0.775) (0.442) (0.160) (0.853)perhousehold −0.128 −0.049 0.228⁎ −0.021 0.045
(0.456) (0.459) (0.079) (0.704) (0.451)isk 1 0.833⁎ −0.089 0.570 0.498⁎⁎ 0.127
(0.070) (0.692) (0.149) (0.010) (0.515)isk 2 −0.457 −0.125 −0.012 0.032 −0.269⁎⁎(0.160) (0.390) (0.964) (0.788) (0.035)
isk 3 0.607 −0.276 −0.202 0.253 −0.126(0.139) (0.335) (0.614) (0.156) (0.464)
ogn skills 0.056 0.119 −0.187 −0.038 0.186⁎⁎(0.791) (0.117) (0.261) (0.601) (0.015)
patience 0.092 0.038 0.067 0.010 −0.022(0.185) (0.261) (0.244) (0.673) (0.390)
onstant 16.916⁎⁎ 9.467⁎⁎⁎ 11.552⁎ −1.474 5.816(0.030) (0.001) (0.087) (0.589) (0.273)
dj/pseudo R2 0.037 0.047 0.058
g likelihood −1591.974 −1184.030 −359.267 −410.884
chi2 2.09⁎⁎⁎ 79.27⁎⁎⁎ 47.13⁎⁎⁎ 36.96 35.64618 618 618 618 618NNotes: dependent variables are displayed on top of the columns. Tobit estimates for models (1) and (2), OLS for model (3) and Probit for models (4) and (5). Robust standard errors are
clustered at the individual level. All regressions control for order effects. p-Values in parentheses. Descriptive statistics: a.) Obese: x̄: 0.017, SD: 0.132, Min: 0, Max: 1; b.) Overweight: x̄:
0.118, SD: 0.323, Min: 0, Max: 1.
⁎ p-Value b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p-Value b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p-Value b 0.01.Table A10. City sample.DG offer UG offer UG mao Trustor Trustee(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)F% 0.011 0.040 −0.013 −0.084 0.002 0.169 −0.005 −0.043 −0.008 −0.032
(0.767) (0.793) (0.595) (0.424) (0.947) (0.102) (0.599) (0.282) (0.526) (0.435)(continued on next page)
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RDG offer UG offer UG mao Trustor Trustee(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)F%sq −0.001 0.001 −0.003* 0.001 0.000
(0.836) (0.481) (0.095) (0.326) (0.523)ender (male) −0.331 −0.319 −0.091 −0.120 −0.193 −0.125 −0.154 −0.168 −0.017 −0.027
(0.526) (0.553) (0.747) (0.676) (0.601) (0.735) (0.263) (0.220) (0.915) (0.866)ge 0.003 0.001 −0.022 −0.016 0.124*** 0.109** 0.007 0.010 0.012 0.015
(0.969) (0.992) (0.677) (0.759) (0.004) (0.012) (0.751) (0.637) (0.556) (0.493)gesq 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.001** −0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.996) (0.972) (0.679) (0.760) (0.011) (0.030) (0.742) (0.620) (0.835) (0.751)arried 1.062 1.068 0.310 0.293 −1.352*** −1.313*** 0.254 0.244 0.111 0.102
(0.120) (0.120) (0.435) (0.462) (0.006) (0.007) (0.124) (0.142) (0.561) (0.589)ivorced 2.102*** 2.103*** 0.246 0.240 −0.977 −0.962 −0.072 −0.073 0.245 0.243
(0.009) (0.008) (0.734) (0.742) (0.225) (0.231) (0.795) (0.792) (0.429) (0.430)idow −0.089 −0.065 0.236 0.179 0.436 0.569 0.211 0.176 0.426 0.402
(0.935) (0.954) (0.709) (0.787) (0.558) (0.442) (0.467) (0.547) (0.259) (0.274)ohabiting −0.135 −0.139 −0.833* −0.827* −0.538 −0.553 0.473* 0.478* −0.232 −0.230
(0.911) (0.908) (0.064) (0.066) (0.442) (0.435) (0.053) (0.050) (0.456) (0.460)nemployed −0.555 −0.541 −0.040 −0.070 0.283 0.354 0.163 0.146 −0.096 −0.106
(0.202) (0.215) (0.873) (0.777) (0.344) (0.242) (0.110) (0.164) (0.446) (0.416)ousehold income −0.135 −0.134 0.019 0.016 0.051 0.059 0.006 0.004 −0.021 −0.022
(0.238) (0.239) (0.748) (0.789) (0.440) (0.378) (0.800) (0.866) (0.443) (0.425)perhousehold 0.051 0.049 −0.055 −0.049 0.245** 0.231** −0.075* −0.072* −0.052 −0.050
(0.744) (0.752) (0.632) (0.660) (0.025) (0.032) (0.071) (0.091) (0.209) (0.235)ducation 0.073 0.071 0.065 0.069 −0.098 −0.109 0.001 0.004 0.013 0.015
(0.533) (0.548) (0.396) (0.370) (0.143) (0.103) (0.963) (0.891) (0.627) (0.594)isk 1 −0.413 −0.410 −0.063 −0.066 1.103*** 1.112*** −0.068 −0.071 −0.382** −0.385**
(0.447) (0.453) (0.842) (0.833) (0.003) (0.002) (0.602) (0.585) (0.016) (0.016)isk 2 0.788* 0.787* −0.074 −0.070 −0.063 −0.073 0.179* 0.181* −0.098 −0.096
(0.059) (0.060) (0.784) (0.794) (0.842) (0.816) (0.094) (0.089) (0.361) (0.371)isk 3 2.088*** 2.083*** 1.141*** 1.154*** −0.666 −0.695 0.782*** 0.788*** 0.531*** 0.538***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.228) (0.210) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.005)ogn skills −0.126 −0.126 −0.050 −0.051 0.227** 0.229** 0.019 0.019 0.107** 0.107**
(0.490) (0.491) (0.607) (0.599) (0.038) (0.035) (0.662) (0.667) (0.012) (0.012)patience −0.092 −0.093 −0.064 −0.062 0.100** 0.096** −0.001 0.000 −0.001 0.000
(0.260) (0.257) (0.105) (0.116) (0.032) (0.040) (0.955) (0.988) (0.973) (0.992)onstant 6.986*** 6.634** 10.917*** 11.741*** 3.226** 1.340 0.595 1.038 0.180 0.465
(0.001) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022) (0.427) (0.263) (0.119) (0.757) (0.532)dj/pseudo R2 0.034 0.037 0.041 0.042 0.087 0.088
g likelihood −2018.869 −2018.846 −1873.047 −1872.686 −435.999 −435.475 −410.884 −410.664
chi2 3.07*** 2.98*** 1.95*** 1.91*** 2.19*** 2.53*** 63.02*** 66.11*** 97.01*** 99.45***753 753 753 753 753NNotes: dependent variables are displayed on top of the columns. Tobit estimates for models (1) and (2), OLS for model (3) and Probit for models (4) and (5). Robust standard errors are
clustered on interviewers (108 groups). All regressions control for order effects. p-Values in parentheses. BF%was calculated using the following formula: BF%=−44.988+ (0.503 × age)
+ (10.689 × sex)+ (3.172× BMI)− (0.026 × BMIsq)+ (0.181× BMI × sex)− (0.02 × BMI × age)− (0.005× BMIsq × sex)+ (0.00021 × BMIsq × age) wheremale=0 and female= 1
for sex, and age in years. Descriptive statistics: BF%: x̄: 27.94, SD: 8.20, Min: 6.98, Max: 50.08.
⁎ p-value b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p-value b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p-value b 0.01.Table A11. Lab sample.DG offer UG offer UG mao Trustor Trustee(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)F% 0.001 −0.071 0.011 −0.02 0.021 0.118 −0.007 −0.020 0.021 0.072*
(0.967) (0.533) (0.347) (0.666) (0.397) (0.212) (0.515) (0.632) (0.104) (0.095)F%sq 0.001 0.001 −0.002 0.000 −0.001
(0.485) (0.442) (0.288) (0.753) (0.226)ender (male) −0.197 −0.279 0.039 0.005 0.185 0.293 0.042 0.028 0.210 0.273
(0.652) (0.550) (0.834) (0.982) (0.596) (0.408) (0.790) (0.867) (0.223) (0.127)ge −0.949 −0.944 −0.011 −0.009 −0.738 −0.744 0.216 0.216 −0.565 −0.627
(0.175) (0.176) (0.961) (0.968) (0.209) (0.205) (0.370) (0.368) (0.266) (0.241)gesq 0.024 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.017 −0.004 −0.004 0.013 0.015
(0.127) (0.127) (0.917) (0.920) (0.204) (0.202) (0.445) (0.445) (0.274) (0.251)nemployed 0.719 0.699 −0.281 −0.291 0.445 0.474 −0.142 −0.144 0.053 0.066
(0.397) (0.411) (0.450) (0.436) (0.515) (0.489) (0.625) (0.620) (0.861) (0.827)ousehold income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.366) (0.381) (0.770) (0.786) (0.408) (0.385) (0.147) (0.142) (0.935) (0.994)perhousehold −0.127 −0.127 −0.052 −0.051 0.224* 0.223* −0.020 −0.020 0.042 0.040
(0.460) (0.462) (0.441) (0.442) (0.084) (0.084) (0.722) (0.724) (0.492) (0.504)isk 1 0.810* 0.798* −0.088 −0.093 0.548 0.564 0.505*** 0.502*** 0.125 0.135
(0.079) (0.084) (0.697) (0.682) (0.163) (0.153) (0.009) (0.010) (0.524) (0.496)isk 2 −0.456 −0.471 −0.128 −0.136 −0.018 0.004 0.034 0.032 −0.274** −0.269**
(0.160) (0.150) (0.379) (0.354) (0.946) (0.989) (0.778) (0.793) (0.032) (0.036)isk 3 0.594 0.591 −0.274 −0.275 −0.210 −0.208 0.256 0.255 −0.137 −0.136
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F/DG offer UG offerFig. A1. Distribution ofUG maogame variables.Trustor Trustee(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)(0.148) (0.149) (0.339) (0.338 (0.600) (0.605) (0.150) (0.151) (0.424) (0.426)
ogn skills 0.056 0.050 0.121 0.119 −0.186 −0.179 −0.039 −0.040 0.191** 0.196**(0.791) (0.812) (0.112) (0.120) (0.262) (0.281) (0.593) (0.585) (0.013) (0.010)
patience 0.092 0.093 0.038 0.039 0.067 0.065 0.010 0.010 −0.022 −0.024(0.186) (0.179) (0.257) (0.250) (0.244) (0.256) (0.672) (0.666) (0.380) (0.353)
onstant 17.331** 18.137** 9.516*** 9.853*** 12.127* 11.142* −1.677 −1.526 5.809 5.861(0.026) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.069) (0.098) (0.536) (0.577) (0.280) (0.295)
dj/pseudo R2 0.036 0.036 0.046 0.046 0.056 0.059
g likelihood −1592.181 −1591.976 −1183.882 −1183.695 −359.593 −359.548 −298.567 −297.918
chi2 2.15*** 2.07*** 78.76*** 78.29*** 47.99*** 1.84 37.00* 37.23 31.74 34.11618 618 618 618 618NNotes: dependent variables are displayed on top of the columns. Tobit estimates for models (1) and (2), OLS for model (3) and Probit for models (4) and (5). Robust standard errors are
clustered at the individual level. All regressions control for order effects. p-Values in parentheses. BF% was calculated using the following formula: BF% =−44.988 + (0.503 × age) +
(10.689 × sex) + (3.172 × BMI)− (0.026 × BMIsq) + (0.181 × BMI × sex)− (0.02 × BMI × age)− (0.005 × BMIsq × sex) + (0.00021 × BMIsq × age) where male = 0 and female
= 1 for sex, and age in years. Descriptive statistics: BF%: x̄: 21.84, SD: 6.84, Min: 1.98, Max: 45.75.
⁎ p-Value b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p-Value b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p-Value b 0.01.References
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